




CURRENT STATE OF THE HUMANITARIAN SITUATION IN YEMEN

Statistics and More e.U.



HUMANITARIAN SITUATION IN YEMEN

Yemen has faced a multiple dimensioned crisis characterized by a violent conflict, a multiplicity of stakeholders, displacement, famine and water shortage, making it a complex emergency and one of the most severe of the new century. Figures of affected people are dramatically high and the complexity of the field is compounded by the geography of the country.

Background of the humanitarian crisis

The events leading to the current humanitarian situation in Yemen started in the wake of the Arab Spring in February 2011 with protests against then president Ali Abdallah Saleh's regime resting on cronyism and military support when he wanted to see his son succeed him. Having been rebelling against Mr. Saleh's rule since 2004, the Houthi movement joined the protests.

Fearing the more and more violent protests and the crackdown to turn into a full scale civil war after Mr. Saleh endured a bombing attack at the presidential palace in June 2011, the Gulf Council Cooperation (GCC), supported by the P5 of the UN, brokered an agreement with President Saleh to hand over the power to his deputy Abd Rabbu Mansur Hadi in November 2011. This agreement included a political transition plan with single-candidate elections to be held in February 2012 in order to ensure Mr. Hadi's legitimacy¹. He was then elected with 99.6% of the votes and was officially recognized by the international community.

As part of the transition plan, the UN and the GCC worked to bring together the government, the main political factions and civil society representatives - including the Houthi movement - in the scope of a National Dialogue Conference from March 2013 to January 2014. This latter was to include proposals for a new federal structure (decentralization of the power to 6 regions) and democratic principles embedded in a new constitution that was worked on until January 2015.

The Houthi movement refused the outcomes of the National Dialogue Conference, claiming more protection of their Zayd culture and a wider political representation with an expanded proper region (Sa'ada) including an access to the Red Sea. They were equally opposed to Mr. Hadi's perceived ties with Islamist leaders². Taking advantage of a weakened central government and of a vacuum in the local power, they could strengthen their territorial base and build alliances with local tribes, including rebel group Ansar Allah and former President Saleh's allies and security forces.

From Summer 2014, this Houthi/Saleh alliance started to spread to the south in order to overthrow the government of Mr. Hadi and push the Islamists further south³. They reached Sana'a in September 2014. In January 2015, the Houthi/Saleh alliance reinforced their control over the capital city and took control of the state institutions and of security forces. President Hadi was forced to resign but he could finally escape to Aden and cancel his resign. The country started to experience two opposing governments. After having been going on to the south, having taken Taizz (third city of the country), the port of Mocha on the Red Sea, the air base of Aden, and then the

¹ *Next Steps in Yemen's Transition*, Washington DC: International Foundation for Electoral Systems, March 2011, p 2.

² The Islamist leaders encompass disparate groups, including Al Qaeda and moderate members of Yemen's Muslim Brotherhood, all of whom supported tribal militias that were long-standing rivals of the Houthis: JONGBERG K., *The conflict in Yemen: Latest developments*, European Parliament, 24 October 2016, p 11.


³ JONGBERG K., *Ibid.*

international airport of Aden, the Houthi/Saleh alliance was controlling the most important part of Yemen and Mr. Hadi was forced to flee to Saudi Arabia in March 2015.

Even though the conflict is not driven by denominational rationales, the perspective of a state of Yemen controlled by a Shii group potentially linked to Iran in its back-garden is not acceptable for Saudi Arabia. The Kingdom built up an Arab coalition that received the support of the USA, the UK and France to start a bombing campaign in order to push back the Houthis/Saleh alliance and reinstate Mr. Hadi's legal and internationally legitimated government. This latter could come back in Aden from his exile in Saudi Arabia in September 2015 and established it as the temporary capital city.

Recently, President Hadi fired the governor of the Central Bank of Yemen (CRY) in Sana'a to move the latter in Aden in order to try to strangle the Houthi-controlled areas, on 19th September 2016⁴. The Houthi/Saleh alliance announced they were establishing a rival government in Sana'a on 2nd October 2016.

Figure 1. Frontlines of the conflict in Yemen as of October 2016



Source: Katherine Zimmerman/criticalthreats.org (October 2016)

UN Resolutions⁵

The UN have adopted several resolutions aimed at favouring a resolution of the conflict in Yemen between 2011 and 2016, especially aimed affirming its commitment to the GCC, to organize an arms embargo and to impose financial and travel ban sanctions on several individuals of the Houthi-Saleh alliance:

- Resolution 2014 (2011) calling for implementation of a political settlement based upon the GCC Initiative and requesting the Secretary-General to continue his good offices;

⁴ JONGBERG K., *op cit.*, p 5.

⁵ Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Yemen, United Nations, <https://osesgy.unmissions.org/background>, accessed on 11 January 2017.

- Resolution 2051 (2012) reaffirming the need for the full and timely implementation of the Transition Agreement and signaling potential sanctions;
- Resolution 2140 (2014) supporting the implementation of the National Dialogue outcomes, reaffirming the need for the full and timely implementation of the political transition, and establishing a sanctions regime under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter;
- Resolution 2201 (2015) deploring the unilateral actions taken by the Houthis to dissolve parliament and take over Yemen's government institutions, expressing grave concern over reports of the use of child soldiers, and urging all parties to continue the transition;
- Resolution 2204 (2015) extending the mandate of the Sanctions Panel of Experts to March 2016.
- Resolution 2216 (April 2015) demanding that all Yemeni parties fully implement resolution 2201 (2015), imposing an arms embargo on selected individuals, and requesting that the Secretary-General intensify his good offices role in order to enable the resumption of the political process.
- Resolution 2266 (2016) extending the asset freeze and travel ban imposed by resolution 2140 (2015) to help stem the crisis in Yemen, which is threatening the country's ongoing political transition.

Timeline of the attempts of conflict resolution⁶

- April 25th 2015: Ismail Ould Cheikh Ahmed appointed as Special Envoy for Yemen;
- May 12th 2015: 5 days humanitarian pause;
- June 2015: After several unsuccessful attempts to bring the parties of the conflict to hold Talks, some were taken in Geneva via interposed third-parties. The belligerents did not meet directly and the Talks did not achieve a reduction of the violence in the country;
- July 2015: UN Secretary General Ban Ki Moon calls for a humanitarian pause that would never materialize;
- December 2015: Political negotiations were led by the Special Envoy in the presence of the UN Special Envoy and of the Yemeni delegations after the Houthi/Saleh alliance accepted UN resolution 2216 as a basis for the negotiations and that the parties agreed on a cease-fire. The Talks produced concrete outcomes such as the creation of a De-escalation and Coordination Committee, confidence-building measures and an agreement on the principles for the implementation of resolution 2216. However, they ended up being adjourned due to a breakdown of the cessation of the hostilities;
- 21st April 2016: Talks started in Kuwait after months of diplomatic efforts to bring the parties back to the table of negotiations however they ended up on 6th August 2016 without any agreement. Disagreement over the sequencing of Houthi retreat and establishment of interim political arrangements that would follow later were part of the issue. There were also disagreements over the creation of a new national unity government from the part of President Hadi⁷;
- 25th August 2016: A meeting was held in the presence of the GCC, the UK, the US, the UN, the UAE and Saudi Arabia in order to start a new approach with regards to the negotiations but little progress was made;
- 20th October 2016: A cease-fire started on 20 October but was not renewed;

Drivers of the humanitarian situation in Yemen

Natural factors

Environmental conditions of the country are elements that contribute to maintain and fuel the current humanitarian crisis. The climate is dry and arid, the temperatures are very high, with very few rainfalls, excepted in the mountains under the effect of the monsoon twice a year. This does not

⁶ Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Yemen, United Nations, <https://osesgy.unmissions.org/timeline>, accessed on 11 January 2017.

⁷ JONGBERG K., *op cit.*, p 8.

favour the agricultural sector, though this latter employs 22% of the labour force⁸ (75% in rural areas)⁹. In 2014, the country disposed only about 2.5% of the land considered as *arable*¹⁰ and only 3.2% of the lands that were considered *agricultural* (i.e. 44.5%) were irrigated¹¹. Yemen was already one of the countries that are the most dependent on food imports in the world in 2014. 55% of the consumed food commodities and 90% of the wheat and wheat products were imported¹², making it extremely reliant upon the volatility of the markets. The life was already very difficult for a wide share of the Yemeni population, with 6.7 million people in situation of undernourishment (about 25%, then)¹³ or 35% of the children under 5 being underweight in 2014¹⁴, as well as an unemployment rate estimated up to 27%¹⁵ or a poverty rate of 54%¹⁶.

The conflict even worsens the situation of food insecurity of an already vulnerable population: Violence and destruction of many public and private infrastructures, unsafety and different forms of blockades have a serious impact on the livelihoods, food (but also fuel) imports, transportation network, on the circulation of goods and on the market supply, and hence on the prices, making it even more difficult for the people to afford food commodities.

Yemen is equally one of the countries in the world disposing the less water resources. These are mainly groundwater, as there are very few perennial surface water, and those have been decreasing over the last 50 years¹⁷. Per capita consumption is therefore of only 125 m³ annually where global average stands at 2.500 m³ per year¹⁸. Yemeni population is also vulnerable in this regard, management of water being one of the biggest challenge that a society has to face in order to address issues of public health and related with agriculture.

Tough natural conditions are thus underlying factor that do not favour the resilience of the population and actually represent additional stress factors contributing to the current humanitarian emergency.

⁸ CIA World Factbook. Yemen, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ym.html>, accessed on 13th January 2017. The World Bank estimate it up to 24.7% in 2010: <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.AGR.EMPL.ZS?locations=YE>, accessed on 13th January 2017.

⁹ SÜMER VAKUR, *The Political-economic Factors Behind Yemen's Water Crisis*, Ankara: ORSAM, August 2016, <http://www.orsam.org.tr/index.php/Content/Analiz/4813?s=su%7Cenglish>, accessed on 13 January 2013.

¹⁰ World Bank data, <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/AG.LND.IRIG.AG.ZS?locations=YE>, accessed on 13th January 2017.

¹¹ World Bank data, <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/AG.LND.IRIG.AG.ZS?locations=YE>, accessed on 13th January 2017.

¹² *Yemen Food Security Update*, Yemen Food Security Information System Development Programme (FSIS), October 2016, p 2.

¹³ FAO Country Indicator, <http://www.fao.org/faostat/en/#country/249>, accessed on 17th January 2017.

¹⁴ FAO Statistical Yearbook. Yemen, FAO, <http://www.fao.org/faostat/en/#country/249>, accessed on 13th January 2017.

¹⁵ CIA World Factbook. Yemen, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ym.html>, accessed on 13th January 2017. The World Bank estimate it up to 24.7% in 2010: <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.AGR.EMPL.ZS?locations=YE>, accessed on 13th January 2017.

¹⁶ CIA World Factbook. Yemen, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ym.html>, accessed on 13th January 2017. The World Bank estimate it up to 24.7% in 2010: <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.AGR.EMPL.ZS?locations=YE>, accessed on 13th January 2017.

¹⁷ SÜMER VAKUR, *op cit.*

¹⁸ Idem.

Infringements of IHL

Widespread disrespect of International Humanitarian Law (IHL) by both parties has created a very unsafe and unpredictable environment as well as a complex operational field. Deliberate strategies and tactics of the belligerents target economic infrastructures such as ports, roads, bridges, factories and markets, as well as water lines, shops hospitals, power stations or residential houses. Civilians are used as shields to protect against indiscriminate airstrikes. The use of forbidden weapons such as landmines, cluster munitions bombs or incendiary weapons create unnecessary damages. Access to medical and food commodities is equally hindered by the embargo enforced by the Saudi-led coalition, while the Houthis constrain the activities of the NGOs.

Terrorism

The presence of terrorist groups AQPA and ISIS is a factor that make the conflict even more complicated. As Sunni groups, they are basically against the Houthis because these are Shia, however they are not especially pro-Hadi. They thrive in environments where the state's power is weak and populations are poor. Al Qaeda has been active in Yemen since the 1990's and AQAP was born from the fusion between Al-Qaeda's Yemen and Saudi Arabia branches in 2009. Yemen's weak state has become a strong basis for the organization since then. AQAP captured the city of Mukalla in April 2015, has then progressively expanded its control westward to Aden and seized some parts of the city¹⁹. ISIS arrived in Yemen in March 2015 with a much more violent operational patten than Al-Qaeda. Targeting the same recruits, ISIS claims its difference from Al-Qaeda in portraying their campaign in Yemen in more distinct sectarian terms²⁰. For example, they organized suicide attacks on two Zaydi mosque in Sana'a in March 2015, killing 140 worshippers, and claimed other high-profile attacks including the assassination of Aden's governor. Their influence remains, though, lower than Al-Qaeda's in Yemen²¹.

With the spread of the Houthi alliance to the south, both these groups could benefit from new recruits. Today, the Saudi-led coalition seems passive towards these, keeping their focus on the Houthis. The importance of these groups has been minimized by the coalition that eventually also benefits from the activity of these groups against the Houthis. As regards with the humanitarian situation in the country, the activity is very unpredictable and murderous for the civilians.

Extent of the crisis

Parties have created a pervasive crisis where millions of civilians face huge threats to their well-being or to simply survive. Besides the fighting, destruction, violence and infringements to IHL, the economy and the institutions are close to collapse:

- Brutal hostilities made 44.000 casualties, including 7.100 deaths²². This figure may be underestimated as the war reduces reporting capacity and because of people's inability to reach health facilities who officially report the casualties;
- Infrastructure has been damaged up to an estimated \$ 19 billion²³ worth, namely more than the half of the country's GDP (37.734 billion in 2015)²⁴;

¹⁹ LAUB Z., *Yemen in Crisis*, Council on Foreign Relations, 19 April 2016, <http://www.cfr.org/yemen/yemen-crisis/p36488>, accessed on January 2017.

²⁰ Idem.

²¹ Idem.

²² *Humanitarian Needs Overview*, OCHA, November 2016, p 5.

²³ *Humanitarian Needs Overview*, OCHA, November 2016, p 5.

²⁴ World Bank: <http://data.worldbank.org/country/yemen-rep>, accessed on 6th January 2016.

- This latter contracted of about 33% in 2015 and 12,8% more in 2016²⁵ and failed from \$ 518 per capita in 2014 to \$ 290 per capita in 2016. The rial lost 30% of its value between early 2015 and the end of 2016²⁶, and the country is experiencing a severe liquidity crunch. According to OCHA, these developments impact the financing of imports of food, medicine, and other critical supplies, compounding the already existing import restrictions, as well as considerably restricting people's ability to access cash and afford to pay basic commodities²⁷;
- Central Bank of Yemen's (CRY) foreign exchange rate dropped from \$ 4.7 billion in December 2014 to \$ 0.987 billion in September 2016, public budget doubled the last year (up to 1.59 trillion rials) and of 32% of the households depending on public revenue (1.25 million directly employed people and 6.9 million dependents on them) are affected by salary arrears²⁸. This further leads key staff to resign from key positions in the public services sector such as doctors, nutrition counsellors or teachers, which increases the gap in the supply of assistance.
- Therefore, households dependents on public salary have become food insecure. Poverty rate reaches 62% of the population, 90% lack access to electricity, 49% of water and sewage facilities have been destroyed in Sana'a and 73% in Taizz²⁹, for example, and only 45% of health facilities only are effectively functional at the national level (30% in Taizz, Sa'ada and Dhale'e and 20% in Marib, Al Jawf, Al Bayda)³⁰.
- In total, 18.8 million people are in need of protection and humanitarian assistance (69% of the Yemeni) today, whose 10.3 million are in acute need³¹ and 8.5 million in moderate need³² and more than 3 million people have been displaced.

As for the humanitarians, access to the field is difficult as, above the operational risk, visa, requests for movements, implementation of operations and activities or customs approval for supplies are often denied or delayed by the authorities, which hinders the delivery of humanitarian assistance. In the field, UN and humanitarian agencies reported grave breaches of international humanitarian law (IHL) by both parties to the conflict and a continued hindrance to the delivery of humanitarian assistance. Besides, it is really difficult for humanitarians to obtain accurate, and comprehensive information due to the volatility of the situation. The operational field is very complex. There are fighting, airstrikes, kidnappings, landmines, many infrastructures are destroyed, including telecommunications and internet services, all constraining stakeholders' ability to operate.

Mapping of the needs

Affected populations and places are mostly located in the west of the country, as there is where people are living. The places where the needs are the most severe are those still experiencing fighting and those with a high number of IDPs: Governorates of Sa'ada, Hajjah, Amran, Amanat Al Asimah and Taizz³³.

²⁵ *Yemen socio-economic update*, Rep. of Yemen Min. of Planning and International Cooperation, Issue 20, November 2016, p 1.

²⁶ *Yemen socio-economic update*, Rep. of Yemen Min. of Planning and International Cooperation, Issue 20, November 2016, p 9.

²⁷ *Humanitarian Needs Overview*, OCHA, November 2016, p 5.

²⁸ *Yemen socio-economic update*, Rep. of Yemen Min. of Planning and International Cooperation, Issue 20, November 2016, p 2.

²⁹ According to the national poverty line: \$ 50/month: *Country Engagement Note for the republic of Yemen for the Period FY 17 – FY 18*, World Bank, June 2016, p 6.


³⁰ *Humanitarian Needs Overview*, OCHA, November 2016, p 9.

³¹ People who require immediate assistance to save and sustain their lives.

³² People who require assistance to stabilize their situation and prevent them from slipping into acute need.

³³ *Humanitarian Needs Overview*, OCHA, November 2016, p 19.

Figure 2. Severity of needs by district



Source: OCHA (November 2016)

Table 1. Districts where the needs are the most severe

| District | Governorate | District | Governorate | District | Governorate |
|---------------|-------------|-----------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|
| Al Quraishyah | Al Bayda | Ash Shamayatayn | Taizz | Majz | Sa'ada |
| Al Mukha | Taizz | Dhubab | Taizz | Razih | Sa'ada |
| Al Misrakh | Taizz | Dimnat Khadir | Taizz | Nihm | Sana'a |
| Al Mudhaffar | Taizz | Hayfan | Taizz | Medghal | Marib |
| Al Qahirah | Al Bayda | Maqbanah | Taizz | Al Ashah | Amran |
| Al Wazi'iyah | Taizz | Mawza | Taizz | Qatabir | Sa'ada |
| As Silw | Taizz | Salh | Taizz | Sa'adah | Sa'adah |
| Bakil Al Mir | Hajjah | Abs | Hajjah | Majzar | Marib |
| Mustaba | Hajjah | Baqim | Sa'ada | Sirwah | Sirwah |
| Harf Sufyan | Amran | | | Harf Sufyan | Amran |

Source: OCHA DATABASE All Clusters (November 2016) ³⁴

Governorates with the **highest number of people in need** (moderate and acute needs aggregated):

- Taizz and Amanat Al Asimah (more than 2 million people in need in each of these governorates),

³⁴ DATABASE OCHA All Clusters, OCHA, November 2016, <http://ochayemen.org/hno-2017/#resources>, accessed on 6th January 2016.

- Al Hudaydah, Ibb, Hajjah and Dhamar (more than 1 million people in need in each of these governorate)³⁵.

Governorate with the highest number of **people in acute needs**:

- Taizz, Amanat Al Asimah, Al Hudaydah and Hajjah (about 1 million PIN and more) followed by Ibb, Sa'ada, Lahj (more than 500.000 PIN)³⁶.

Governorates with the **highest number of affected people to their total population**:

- Shabwah (88%), Sa'ada (88%), Aden (86%), Lahj (83%), Amanat Al Asimah (78%), Taizz (77%) Al Jawf (76%), Al Dhale (75%)³⁷.

Key information by sector³⁸

- Food insecurity³⁹: 14.1 million people (7 million being severely food insecure). Food insecurity has been driven by the disruption of markets and job losses due to violence and insecurity, together coupled with fluctuations of food prices and reduction of imports (while Yemen was relying on imports for 90% of its staple food consumption before the crisis), making the economy collapse;
- 4.5 million people need assistance to prevent or treat malnutrition, with 4 million in acute need situated in the most affected areas. Most pressing needs are located in the governorates of Hudaydah, Hajjah, Amanat al Asimah, Sa'ada, Taizz, Ibb, Dhamar, Hadramaut, Lahj and Aden. Within these, 1.7 million children and 1.1 million pregnant or lactating mothers suffer from Moderate Acute Malnutrition (MAM) and 462.000 children are currently suffering from Severe Acute Malnutrition (SAM). 1.2 million infants and young children have equally be reported to be in need of high-energy diet;
- WASH: 14 million people (8.2 million in acute need) in need of drinkable water, and sanitation. The destruction of water and sewage facilities and the deterioration of WASH conditions have fostered the appearance of cholera (about 100 cholera associated death and 12.000 suspected cases since October)⁴⁰, dengue and scabies;
- Disruption of the health care system has reduced the access to healthcare for 14.8 million people, with 8.8 million reported to be in acute need. This increases the risk of maternal and new-born death, as well as of communicable diseases outbreaks. Restrictions on imports and financial transactions lead to reduced medicine and health furniture. The vaccination coverage has equally been reported to be low recently (Pentavalent vaccine 3 at 64 per cent; measles and rubella at 59 per cent);
- 4.5 million people need shelter and Non-Food Items, with 3.9 million ones who are living in conflict-affected areas. Most vulnerable people are the 420.000 IDPs living in collective centers and spontaneous settlements, while the 1.2 million ones hosted by other households overcrowded their host families. IDPs' main shelter needs are family tents, emergency shelter kits and winterization materials. As for the NFI, most mentioned ones are blankets, clothes, mattresses and kitchen sets. Materials for repairing damaged homes are also highly required for the returnees;
- The whole population is at risk of being killed or injured in Yemen and all the Yemeni are facing restricted freedom of movement (whether coerced or not) because of insecurity.

³⁵ *DATABASE OCHA All Clusters*, OCHA, November 2016, <http://ochayemen.org/hno-2017#resources>, accessed on 6th January 2016.

³⁶ *DATABASE OCHA All Clusters*, OCHA, November 2016, <http://ochayemen.org/hno-2017#resources>, accessed on 6th January 2016.

³⁷ *DATABASE OCHA All Clusters*, OCHA, November 2016, <http://ochayemen.org/hno-2017#resources>, accessed on 6th January 2016.

³⁸ *Humanitarian Needs Overview*, OCHA, November 2016

³⁹ Food insecurity refers to the lack of reliable access to sufficient quantities of nutritious food.

⁴⁰ *Yemen Complex Emergency Fact Sheet #4 FY 2017*, USAID, 6 January 2017, p 1.

However, humanitarian stakeholders estimate that 11.3 million of them need protection, especially women and children, but also IDPs, returnees, older people, people with disabilities and chronic illness. Most acute needs (2.9million people) of protection both in terms of civilian casualties, displacement, child rights violation and Gender-Based Violence (GBV) are identified in districts of the governorates of Amanat Al Asimah, Taizz, Hajjah, Sa'ada, Al Bayda, Al Dhale'e, Abyan, Aden, Lahj, Amran, Marib and Shabwah⁴¹.

Most vulnerable groups⁴²

Women and girls

Women were already experiencing gender inequalities prior to the conflict, such as limited access to services and livelihoods, because of prevailing social norms. The conflict has even more compounded the difficulties of this category of people.

- Female-headed households have to rely on negative coping strategies that expose them to physical or sexual abuse and exploitation;
- Early and child marriage is a deep issue, with 52% of the girls under 18 and 14% under 15 having been married. Early marriage is used as a coping mechanism by the most vulnerable and most affected groups;
- Other issues like Sex and Gender-Based (SGB) violence and psychological distress are equally a very big issue. Their extent remains, though, difficult to assess beyond the reported cases (About 8.000 cases whose the half were reported in the governorates of Al Hudaydah, Sana'a, Abyan, Taizz and Aden).

Children

It has been reported that children are highly affected by the conflict, with 1.300 death out of the 7.100 reported ones (about 18%). The category of children is exposed to recruitment into armed groups and to child labour as coping mechanisms. Verifications of this fact are consistently increasing. Furthermore, 1.604 schools have been destroyed have been damaged, destroyed or are used as shelters, and 2 million children are currently out of school (whom 513.000 are displaced). Out of schooling and the experience of war may put them at risk, and destabilize their psychological balance, emotions and behaviour, and jeopardize their future.

IDPs

- About 2.2 million people have been displaced by the conflict within the country.
- Most of the IDPs are situated in Hajjah (490.000), Taizz (430.000) and Sana'a (210.000), Al Asimah (160.000) and Dhamar (140.000);
- 1.2 million of them are living with a host household and 480.000 are living in rented accommodation. These two categories account for 77% of the IDPs;
- 19% of the IDPs live in public buildings, collective centers or spontaneous settlements where services are even more limited and protection risks even higher (gender-based violence, harassment, exploitation, etc.);
- 85% of the IDPs have been displaced for more than a year;

Displacement is not an indicator of need in itself but it constitutes a risk, especially when the displacement becomes protracted and resources dwindle.

Returnees

- About 1 million people have returned to their area of origin;

⁴¹ *DATABASE OCHA All Clusters*, OCHA, November 2016, <http://ochayemen.org/hno-2017/#resources>, accessed on 6th January 2016.

⁴² *Humanitarian Needs Overview*, OCHA, November 2016.

- 86% are living in their previous residence.

Returns mean that violence in the concerned areas have potentially decreased. Protection needs nevertheless still exist, related to the absence of livelihoods and the need to rely on negative coping strategies or existence of landmines. Most of the returnees' home are damaged or have become uninhabitable. 80% of the returnees are concentrated in the governorates of Aden, Amanat Al Asimah, Taizz, Lahj and Shabwah.

Refugees, asylum seekers and migrants⁴³

- On a population of 1.7 to 2 million refugees, asylum seekers and migrants transiting to Gulf countries, 460.000 are in need of humanitarian assistance;
- Most of the refugees are Somali (90% of the 278.000 ones) and most of the asylum seekers report to be Ethiopians (there are about 300-400.000 asylum seekers);
- Yemen also welcomed 98.000 arrivals between January and September 2016 despite the dangerous journey across the sea and the ongoing conflict, of whom 35% were unaccompanied minors.

These categories of people are also in dire need of humanitarian assistance as the failed state of Yemen cannot provide legal documents neither basic services in time. Many asylum seekers and migrants equally face protection risks such as expulsion, exploitation, extortion, starvation or captivity.

Operational Presence

There were 114 humanitarian organizations (74 National NGOs, 32 International NGOs and 8 UN agencies) working in Yemen and operating from hubs in Aden, Al Hudaydah, Ibb, Sa'ada and San'a as of November 2016. MSF is also working in Yemen, as well as the Red Cross/Red Crescent (excepted the Qatari Red Cross, but these organisms are operating independently from OCHA's cluster system).

⁴³ *Humanitarian Needs Overview*, OCHA, November 2016, p 17.

Table 1. Number of organization by cluster per hub (as of November 2016)

| Hub | Emergency Employment and Community Rehabilitation Cluster (EECR) | Education | Food Security and Agriculture | Health | Nutrition | Protection | Refugees & Migrants | Shelter/NFI/CCCM | WASH | Total |
|------------|--|-----------|-------------------------------|--------|-----------|------------|---------------------|------------------|------|-------|
| Aden | 15 | 8 | 26 | 21 | 10 | 7 | 6 | 10 | 13 | 61 |
| Aukalla | 1 | 1 | 9 | 9 | 4 | 4 | 2 | 3 | 3 | 22 |
| AlHudaydah | 5 | 3 | 27 | 16 | 10 | 10 | 3 | 6 | 13 | 57 |
| Ibb | 2 | 4 | 25 | 14 | 7 | 7 | 2 | 7 | 14 | 51 |
| Sa'ada | / | 1 | 14 | 9 | 8 | 8 | / | 3 | 8 | 29 |
| Sana'a | 3 | 6 | 29 | 23 | 9 | 9 | 6 | 11 | 12 | 60 |

Source: OCHA (25 December 2016)

Table 2. Number of organization by cluster by governorate (as of November 2016)

| Governorate | Emergency Employment and Community Rehabilitation Cluster (EECR) | Education | Food Security and Agriculture | Health | Nutrition | Protection | Refugees & Migrants | Shelter/NFI/CCCM | WASH | Total |
|------------------|--|-----------|-------------------------------|--------|-----------|------------|---------------------|------------------|------|-------|
| Abyan | 7 | 2 | 11 | 11 | 7 | 4 | / | 2 | 7 | 29 |
| Aden | 7 | 7 | 16 | 17 | 9 | 6 | 5 | 9 | 10 | 49 |
| Al Bayda | / | 1 | 4 | 7 | 4 | 3 | 1 | / | 2 | 15 |
| AlDhale'e | 3 | 2 | 11 | 12 | 6 | 4 | / | 3 | 7 | 30 |
| AlHudaydah | 4 | 1 | 13 | 12 | 12 | 9 | 3 | 3 | 6 | 35 |
| Al Jawf | / | 1 | 8 | 5 | 2 | 4 | / | 3 | 7 | 19 |
| Al Maharah | / | / | 4 | 4 | / | 2 | / | 1 | / | 9 |
| Al Mahwit | / | 2 | 4 | 4 | 2 | 3 | 2 | / | 1 | 14 |
| Amanat Al Asimah | 3 | 5 | 14 | 12 | 2 | 8 | 5 | 3 | 6 | 38 |
| Amran | / | 2 | 13 | 13 | 7 | 7 | / | 5 | 5 | 34 |
| Dhamar | / | 2 | 3 | 6 | 1 | 4 | / | 3 | / | 15 |
| Hadramaut | 1 | 1 | 6 | 8 | 3 | 4 | 2 | 2 | 3 | 18 |
| Hajjah | 4 | 2 | 18 | 13 | 7 | 9 | / | 5 | 12 | 43 |

| | | | | | | | | | | |
|---------|---|---|----|----|---|---|---|---|----|----|
| Ibb | 1 | 3 | 12 | 8 | 4 | 5 | 2 | 2 | 3 | 26 |
| Lahj | 8 | 4 | 12 | 16 | 8 | 4 | 5 | 2 | 9 | 35 |
| Marib | / | 2 | 6 | 9 | 2 | 1 | / | 2 | 2 | 17 |
| Raymah | / | 2 | 5 | 3 | 2 | 3 | / | / | 1 | 11 |
| Sa'ada | / | 1 | 11 | 9 | 6 | 7 | / | 1 | 3 | 25 |
| Sana'a | 1 | 2 | 14 | 14 | 6 | 5 | 1 | 2 | 4 | 32 |
| Shabwah | / | 1 | 10 | 11 | 5 | 4 | 4 | / | 3 | 21 |
| Socotra | / | / | 5 | 3 | 1 | / | / | / | 1 | 9 |
| Taizz | 1 | 3 | 22 | 12 | 8 | 6 | 2 | 6 | 13 | 44 |

Source: OCHA (December 2016)

Table 3. Organizations operating in Yemen and number of governorates where they implement their activities (by sector) (as of November 2016)

| Abbreviation | Hub | Emergency Employment and Community Rehabilitation Cluster (EECR) | Education | Food Security and Agriculture | Health | Nutrition | Protection | Refugees & Migrants | Shelter/NFI/CCM | WASH |
|-----------------------------|--|--|-----------|-------------------------------|--------|-----------|------------|---------------------|-----------------|------|
| AB (NNGO ⁴⁴) | Al-Bena'a Association | | | | | | 1 | | | |
| ACCFFSW (NNGO) | Al-Amal Charitable Community for Social Welfare | | | | | | | 2 | | |
| ACF-F (INGO ⁴⁵) | Action Contre La Faim (Action Against Hunger) - France | | | 6 | 6 | 2 | | | | 4 |
| ACTED (INGO) | Agency for Technical | 1 | | 6 | | | | | | 3 |

⁴⁴ National Non-Governmental Organization

⁴⁵ International Non-Governmental Organization

| | | | | | | | | | |
|----------------|--|---|----|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Cooperation & Development Abs | | | | | | | | |
| ADO (NGO) | Development Organization Adventist | | 2 | 3 | 1 | 2 | | | |
| ADRA (INGO) | Development and Relief Agency | 1 | 5 | 2 | 1 | | 1 | 1 | 5 |
| AFHD (NNGO) | Al-Raeeda Foundation fo Human Development | | | | | | | | 2 |
| AISDC (NNGO) | Al-Atta Institution for Social Development & Charity | | | | | | | | 2 |
| AL AF (NNGO) | Al-Amal Foundation | | | | | | | 1 | |
| Al-Kair (NNGO) | Al Khair Al-Aman | | | | | | | | 2 |
| AOBWC (NNGO) | Organization for Development and Culture Arkan | | 11 | | | | | | 2 |
| AODC (NNGO) | Organization for Development and Culture | | 1 | | | | | | 2 |
| BEF (NNGO) | BelArabi Ensan Foundantion | | | | | | | 1 | |
| BFD (NNGO) | Building Foundation | | | 2 | 3 | | | | |

| | | | | | | | | | | |
|-----------------|--|---|---|---|---|---|--|---|---|---|
| | for Development | | | | | | | | | |
| BFF (NNGO) | Best Future Foundation | | | | | | | | 1 | |
| BSCA (NNGO) | BUNIA Social Charities Association | | 1 | | | | | | | |
| CARE (INGO) | CARE International Yemen | 2 | 6 | | | | | | | 6 |
| CC (NGO) | Civil Confederacy for Peace | | 1 | | | | | | | |
| CHR. Taiz (NGO) | The Coalition for Humanitarian Relief - Taiz | | 1 | | | | | | | |
| CPCO (NNGO) | Child Protection Care Organization | | 1 | | | | | 1 | | |
| CSSW (NNGO) | Charitable Society for Social Welfare | | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | | 2 | | |
| CYPO (NNGO) | Child & Youth Protection for Social Welfare | | | | | | | 3 | | |
| DA (INGO) | Direct Aid | | 1 | 3 | | | | | | 1 |
| DO (NNGO) | Diversity Organization | | | | | | | | | 1 |
| DRC (INGO) | Danish Refugee Council | | 2 | | | | | 2 | | 2 |
| EFD (NNGO) | Enjaz Foundation for Development | | 6 | | | | | | | |

| | | | | | | | |
|-------------------------|--|---|----|---|---|---|---|
| EHF (NNGO) | Eshah Foundation | | | | | 1 | |
| FAF (NNGO) | For All Foundation | 1 | | | | | |
| FAO (UN ⁴⁶) | Food and Agriculture Organization | | 13 | | | | |
| FMF (NNGO) | Field Medical Foundation | | 1 | 6 | 6 | | |
| GC (INGO) | Global Communities | | 3 | | | | |
| GCMY (NNGO) | Global Change Makers Yemen | | 4 | | | 1 | |
| GIZ (INGO) | German Agency for International Cooperation | 2 | | | | | 4 |
| GWQ (NNGO) | Generation without Qat | | | | | | 1 |
| HADO (INGO) | Humanitarian Aid and Development Organization | | | 6 | 7 | | 1 |
| HAI (INGO) | Human Appeal International | | 6 | | | | |
| HCR (NNGO) | Health Care and Relief Foundation | | | 1 | | | |
| HI (INGO) | Handicap International | | | 1 | | | |
| HSC (NGO) | Hajja Social Charitable Foundation | | | | | 1 | |

⁴⁶ United Nations agency

| | | | | | | | | | | |
|-----------------|----|--|---|----|---|----|---|---|--|---|
| IH (INGO) | UK | Islamic Help United Kingdom | 2 | | | | | | | |
| IMC (INGO) | | International Medical Corps | 2 | 7 | 6 | | 1 | | | 7 |
| INTERSOS (INGO) | | Intersos Humanitarian Aid organization | | 2 | 2 | 13 | 8 | 2 | | |
| IOM (UN) | | International Organization for Migration | 6 | 15 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 7 | | 7 |
| IRC (INGO) | | International Rescue Committee | 2 | 8 | 5 | | | | | 4 |
| IRD (INGO) | | International Relief Development | | | | | 1 | | | |
| IRY (INGO) | | Islamic Relief Yemen | 2 | 11 | 3 | | | | | |
| ITDC (INGO) | | International Training and Development Center | 1 | | | | | | | |
| IYCY (NNGO) | | International Youth Council Yemen | 1 | | | | | | | |
| KYR (NNGO) | | Kuwait yemen relief | | 2 | | | | | | |
| LFPDO (NNGO) | | Life Flow fo peace & Development Organization | 1 | | | | | | | |
| LMMPO (NNGO) | | Life Makers Meeting Place Organization | 1 | | | | | 2 | | |

| | | | | | | | | | |
|-----------------|---|---|---|----|----|---|---|---|---|
| LPC (NNGO) | Life and Peace Coalition | 5 | | | | | | | |
| MASD (NNGO) | Al-Manal Association for Social Developments | | | | | | 1 | | |
| MC (iNGO) | Mercy Corps | 4 | 2 | 10 | 2 | | | | 4 |
| MDF (NNGO) | Millenium Development Foundation | 1 | | | | | | | |
| MDM (INGO) | Medecins du Monde | | | 1 | 1 | | | | |
| MF (NNGO) | Mozn Foundation | | | | | | 1 | | |
| MFD (NNGO) | Mayar Foundation for Development | 1 | | | | | | | |
| MMFY (NNGO) | Medical Mercy Foundation Yemen | | | | 2 | 1 | | | |
| MSIY (15) | Marie Stopes International Yemen | | | | 15 | | | | |
| NFDHR (NNGO) | National Foundation for Development and humanitarian Response | | | 2 | 2 | | 1 | 1 | 3 |
| NLSD (NNGO) | New Life for Solidarity and Development | | 1 | | | | | | |
| NMO (NNGO) | Nahda Makers Organization | 1 | | | | | | | 2 |

| | | | | | | | | |
|-------------------|---|---|---|----|---|---|---|---|
| NOHW (NNGO) | National Organization for Humanitaria n Work | | 1 | | 1 | | | |
| NPF (NNGO) | National Prisoner Foundation | | | 1 | | | | |
| NRC (INGO) | Norwegian refugee Council | 1 | 2 | 6 | | | 1 | 3 |
| OXFAM (INGO) | Oxford Committee for Famine Relief | | | 4 | | | | 8 |
| PA (INGO) | partner Aid | | | | | | | 2 |
| PU-AMI (INGO) | Première Urgence - Aide Médicale Internationale | | | 2 | | 2 | | |
| PY (NNGO) | Partners yemen | 1 | | | | | | |
| QC (INGO) | Qatar Charity | | | 19 | | 3 | | |
| QRCS (INGO) | Qatar Red Crescent Society | | | | | 9 | | 1 |
| Raeduun (NNGO) | Readuun Foundation for Development Relief and Development | | 3 | | | | | |
| RDP (NNGO) | Peer Foundation Relief | | | 4 | | | | |
| RI (INGO) | International Response | | | 2 | | 3 | 3 | |
| RN (NNGO) | Network | | 1 | | | | | |

| | | | | | | |
|----------------|---|---|----|---|----|---|
| Y Group (NNGO) | Y Group for Social Development Yamaan | 1 | | | | |
| Yamaan (NNGO) | Foundation for Health and Social Development Yemen | | 14 | | | |
| YARH (NNGO) | Association for Reproductive Health | | | | 1 | |
| YCTJ (NNGO) | Yemen Center for Transitional Justice | | | | | 3 |
| YCYOD (NNGO) | Yemen Child & Youth Organization for Development Yemeni | | | | 1 | |
| YDN (NNGO) | Development Network for NGOs | | 6 | | | |
| YFCA (NNGO) | Yemen Family Care Association Youth | 1 | 1 | 7 | | 1 |
| YLDF (NNGO) | Leadership Development Foundation | | 2 | | 6 | |
| YSF (NNGO) | Youth Spirit Foundation | | | | | 1 |
| YWU (NNGO) | Yemen Women's Union | | 1 | | 20 | |
| ZOA (INGO) | ZOA International | | | | | 1 |


Source: OCHA (December 2016)

Figure 4. Number of organizations operating in each governorate and within each cluster (as of November 2016)



Source: OCHA (December 2016)

Figure 5. Number of organizations operating in each governorate (as of November 2016)



Source: OCHA (December 2016)

Funding status of the humanitarian situation in Yemen⁴⁷

\$ 1.38 billion have been funded by a range of donors to address the severe ongoing humanitarian crisis in Yemen. Among this, \$ 943.9 million contributions were funded out of the \$ 1.63 billion requested by the Yemen Humanitarian Response Plan (YHRP – funded up to 58% of the requirements) and \$ 438.1 million were made outside the YHRP.

Main donors within the YHRP are the USA (315.5 \$ million), the UK (166.2 \$ million), Saudi Arabia (56.3 \$ million), Germany (56 \$ million), the European Commission (51.4 \$ million), Japan (41 \$ million) and Kuwait (25.6 \$ million). Main contributors to the total humanitarian funding outside the YHRP are the UAE (279.9 million), Saudi Arabia (90.2 million) and the European Commission (\$ 34.7 million).

Additional pledges of \$ 98.3 million and \$ 13 million were promised within the YHRP by Saudi Arabia and the UAE, respectively. Additional pledges were equally made outside the YHRP by Qatar (\$ 110 million), Kuwait (\$ 100 million), the UEA (\$ 31.1 million) as well as \$ 10 million pledges from private donors.

Some clusters are, though very low-funded, such as the Education Cluster (\$ 1.1 million out of the requested \$ 33.4 million, i.e. 3% of the requirements), the Emergency Employment and Community Rehabilitation Cluster (\$ 4.5 million out of the requested \$ 50.6 million, i.e. 9% of the requirements), the shelter/CCCM/NFIs Cluster (\$ 16.6 million out of the requested \$158.3 million, i.e. 10% of the requirements).

The most funded clusters are the Coordination cluster (\$ 11.9 million out of the requested \$17.6 million, i.e. 67% of the requirements), the Food Security and Agriculture Cluster (427.4 million out of the requested 746 million, i.e. 57% of the requirements) - which represents by the way about 46% of the whole YHRP itself, and the Nutrition Cluster (\$ 53.6 million out of the requested \$ 102.9 million, i.e. 52% of the requirements).

Table 2. Funding status of the YHRP

| US (\$ million) | Revised requirements by cluster | Funded | Unmet | % Funded |
|--------------------------------------|---------------------------------|--------|-------|----------|
| Coordination | 17.6 | 11.9 | 5.7 | 67% |
| Education | 33.4 | 1.1 | 32.2 | 3% |
| EECR⁴⁸ | 50.6 | 4.5 | 46.1 | 9% |
| ETC⁴⁹ | 1.8 | 0.0 | 1.8 | 0% |
| Food Security and Agriculture | 746 | 427.4 | 318.6 | 57% |
| Health | 182.3 | 73.2 | 109.1 | 40% |
| Logistics | 44 | 19 | 25 | 43% |
| Nutrition | 102.9 | 53.6 | 49.3 | 52% |
| Protection | 80.7 | 31.3 | 49.5 | 39% |

⁴⁷ *Yemen: humanitarian Response Plan – Funding Status*, OCHA, 5 December 2016.

⁴⁸ Emergency Employment and Community Rehabilitation

⁴⁹ Emergency Communications

Report Name

| | | | | |
|--|-------|------|-------|-----|
| Refugees and Migrants | 73.9 | 8.8 | 65 | 12% |
| Shelter/CCCM ⁵⁰ /NFIs ⁵¹ | 158.3 | 16.6 | 141.7 | 10% |
| WASH | 141.1 | 40.8 | 100.3 | 29% |

Source: OCHA (December 2016)

⁵⁰ Camp Coordination and Camp Management

⁵¹ NFI = Non-Food Items